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Abstract 
 
Starting in the 1970s, many OECD countries allowed for early exit from the labour market on 
a massive scale. The literature has mainly focused on the socio-economic and institutional 
determinants of individual early retirement decisions. These are facilitated by generous and 
accessible public ‘pathways’ into retirement in the pension system, unemployment insurance 
or disability benefits. It is still unclear, however, why in some countries early exit could 
become so much more prevalent than in others. After all, despite a more recent shift back 
towards higher employment rates and ‘active ageing’, cross-national differences remain. We 
test a logic of sectoral cost-shifting politics involving cross-class alliances in the tradable 
sector, against a more traditional class-based logic of welfare state policymaking. Based on a 
quantitative analysis of employment outcomes in 21 countries between 1975 and 2010, we 
show that the political economy of early exit clearly rests on the sectoral politics of cost-
shifting.  
 
Keywords: employment, globalization, industrial relations, labour market institutions, welfare 
state, early retirement, pensions 
JEL classification: F66, J21, J26 
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Introduction 
From the 1970s onwards, employment rates of older people decreased significantly in the 
OECD. Despite this overall trend, we can observe a remarkable cross-country variation in the 
extent of early exit from the labour market. Although different OECD-countries started from 
quite similar levels in the post-war decades, by 1995, the male employment rate for the age 
group between 55 and 64 years was about 80 per cent in Switzerland and Japan while it was 
as low as 34 per cent in Belgium and France. As pension systems came under strain, due to 
demographic aging as well as diminishing possibilities and political willingness to increase 
revenues, closing the various early exit options from the labour market for older workers 
became one of the prime policy goals from the late 1990s onwards and ‘active ageing’ 
became the new buzzword. While employment has indeed increased in virtually all countries, 
large differences remain. What explains these cross-national differences in the extent of early 
exit?  
The decision to retire early is made by individual workers and is, of course, influenced by 
individual circumstances, including poor health, job satisfaction and the depreciation of skills. 
However, this is clearly not the whole story. A large literature in economics and sociology has 
analyzed the ways in which incentives embedded in the social security system provide 
pathways that make early exit from the labour force more likely (Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1998; 
Börsch-Supan et al., 2009; Damman et al., 2011; Engelhardt, 2012; Gruber and Wise, 1999; 
Kubicek et al., 2010; Siegrist et al., 2007; Wahrendorf et al., 2012; Wang, 2012).1 It has been 
demonstrated that macro-level welfare state institutions providing pathways to early 
retirement are a key determinant of retirement decisions, explaining a large share of variance 
                                                           
1
 Further determinants that have been discussed are stereotyping of older workers by employers (Van Dalen et 
al., 2009) and cross-national differences in voters’ beliefs about a possible trade-off between employment of 
younger and older workers (Kemmerling, 2007). 
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in labour market participation and exit, even when controlling for individual-level 
characteristics (Börsch-Supan et al., 2009; Engelhardt, 2012).  
In this paper, we argue that the politics of early exit – and of ‘active ageing’, understood here 
as rolling back early exit policies2 – diverge from the traditional class-based logic of welfare 
state development, represented by the power resources approach (Huber and Stephens, 2001; 
Korpi, 1983). Rather than factors such as the strength of trade unions or the partisan 
composition of government, it is the structure of industrial relations and sectoral politics that 
explain cross-national differences in early retirement. We find that in the case of decentralized 
industrial relations the prevalence of early exit is higher, which indicates a sectoral rather than 
class-based logic. Costs of industrial restructuring are shifted from sectors exposed to global 
competition to sheltered and service sectors. Externalization leads to higher early exit rates 
and a slower reversal of early exit trends. By contrast, early exit is low under conditions of a 
highly centralized industrial relations system when the cost-shifting game does not work. 
Similar arguments have mainly been made by qualitative single-country or small-N studies so 
far (Ebbinghaus, 2006; Hartlapp and Kemmerling, 2008; Mares, 2001; Trampusch, 2005). 
Our study is thus the first large-N analysis focusing specifically on the political economy of 
early exit.3  
Our findings must be seen against the background of the more general literature on welfare 
state development and reform. The still dominant view of the welfare state is that it is a 
product of class politics. Left power resources are considered the most important drivers of 
extensive protections against the most common risks wage earners and their families are 
facing in a capitalist economy. More importantly, class politics seem to explain large part of 
the variation between advanced economies when it comes to welfare state institutions and 
                                                           
2
 We are aware that employment is only one aspect of the multifaceted concept of active ageing (Boudiny, 
2013). 
3
 Hartlapp and Kemmerling’s article (2008) is a partial exception, as they embed their case studies in 
comparative data. 
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outcomes. While we do not wish to reject this view wholesale, our findings help to add 
nuance to the common views about the politics of welfare state research. We will discuss the 
implications of our findings in more detail in the conclusion. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we describe the patterns of early exit over 
time and across countries in the OECD since 1975. In the theory section, we discuss the 
literature on the macro-determinants of early exit and develop a set of hypotheses. The section 
that follows presents the model and the data used to test our main hypotheses while 
controlling for important socio-structural and economic factors. We go on to present our 
results. The final section sums up and concludes. 
 
From early exit to active ageing: Examining the basic empirical pattern 
Decreasing employment participation of older workers is the product not only of individual 
preferences and circumstances but also of incentives embedded in public policies. A number 
of authors have shown, for example, that early exit rates are sensitive to differences and 
changes in early retirement pension rules (Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Blöndal and Scarpetta, 
1998; Duval, 2003). Yet we also know from the qualitative literature in comparative welfare 
state research that in most countries there exists not a single early exit scheme but ‘a complex 
multitude of exit opportunities across diverse public programs and private welfare 
arrangements’ (Ebbinghaus, 2006: 10) or early exit ‘pathways’ (Kohli et al., 1991).  
The most important policy instruments allowing for early exit are special provisions in old 
age pensions (e.g. an early or flexible statutory retirement age), special pre-retirement 
provisions in unemployment insurance (e.g. waiving the obligation to look for work, extra 
long-term benefits), lenient regulation of disability benefits (e.g. taking general labour market 
conditions into account in the decision to grant benefits) and a favourable tax regime for 
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private-sector early retirement policies (e.g. for company severance pay, sectoral early 
retirement funds, part-time employment rules). Through these and other means, the state can 
directly promote or subsidize labour market exit for older workers (De Deken, 2002; 
Eichhorst, 2011; Gieselink et al., 2002; Van der Veen and Trommel, 1999). Early exit into an 
old age pension tends to be available only from age 60 in many countries, while a special 
unemployment status and disability benefits are often available from age 55 or even earlier. 
Historically, early exit policies were often officially promoted as an instrument against 
unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, through the replacement of older workers 
with young people at the beginning of their career.  
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Since there are multiple and complex institutional ‘pathways’ of early exit which are 
impossible to capture with a single policy indicator, we focus on the central outcome measure 
of early exit policies in our analysis, namely employment rates of older workers. Figure 1 
shows the mean employment ratio of older workers across countries. In the first period from 
1975 until 1994 the employment ratio of older workers decreased in nearly all countries of 
our sample (the one exception is Italy). The figure illustrates that on average the ratio of older 
workers dropped by 13 per cent. In contrast, in the second half of our observation period, the 
employment ratio increased by 7.3 per cent on average across all countries. ‘Active ageing’ 
thus appears to be more than just a buzzword in the OECD.  
Figure 1: Mean employment ratio of older workers (male, 55-64 years), 21 countries, 
1975-2010 
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Source: OECD Labour Force Data.  
 
To reveal the country-specific paths, figure 2 presents the national patterns of employment 
rates of older workers for the same period. The figure confirms that despite large differences 
in the level of employment rates of older workers across countries, the broad development 
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over time is quite uniform. All countries show relatively high employment rates in 1975. The 
late 1970s and 1980s are characterized by a decline in employment rates of older male 
workers, reaching the bottom in the 1990s before rising again. Some countries, such as 
Greece, Spain and Ireland, also display a sharp decline in 2009-2010 due to the Financial 
Crisis of 2008. In 2010, employment rates still differ strongly across countries ranging from 
42 per cent in France to 79.5 per cent in New Zealand. Overall, most countries have not (yet) 
reached their starting levels again. 
 
Figure 2: Employment ratio or older workers (male, 55-64 years), 1975-
2010
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Source: OECD Labour Force Data. 
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For our purposes, the most interesting phenomenon are not the changes over time but the 
enormous differences in employment levels between countries which show that early exit was 
used much less in some countries than in others. As figure 3 reveals, this is reflected in the 
average employment ratio of older male workers by country across the entire period. The 
employment rate for older male workers was – and often still is – particularly low in many 
continental European countries (except Switzerland) and much higher in Scandinavia and in 
most English-speaking countries as well as in Japan (Hofäcker and Pollnerová, 2006).  
 
Figure 3: Average Employment Ratio of Older Workers (55-64 years) by Country, 1975-
2010 
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Source: OECD Labour Force Data. 
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To examine whether the identified cross-national differences purely reflect the cross-national 
variation in overall employment rates, we additionally look at a further indicator, namely 
what we call the employment gap. The employment gap of older workers is the difference 
between average employment rates of older men and the overall male working age population 
(see figure 4). Just like in the case of employment rates, lower values reflect stronger 
incidence of early exit. The figure reveals that the country ranking is very similar to the one in 
figure 3. The two indicators are closely interrelated which is also indicated by a correlation 
coefficient of .927. Only some countries change their position, notably Ireland which is in the 
middle category with regard to the employment ratio of older workers but has the third lowest 
employment gap. 
Figure 4: Average Employment Gap by Country, 1975-2010 
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Note: Employment Gap = Employment Ratio of Older Male Workers – Overall Employment 
Ratio of Male Workers 
Source: OECD Labour Force Data. 
11 
 
What explains these large cross-national differences in the employment ratio of older workers 
and in the employment gap? Why did countries follow different trajectories with regard to 
these early exit outcomes? 
The political economy of early exit: Sectoral or class-based logics? 
According to one logic, early exit can be understood as a response to increased pressure for 
industrial restructuring (Ebbinghaus, 2006). Why? The pressure stems from the twin process 
of the rise of the knowledge economy and economic globalization. Older workers should be 
particularly affected by globalization, due to (perceptions of) lower flexibility, high wages 
and outdated skills. Naturally, not all companies are subject to these pressures to the same 
extent. The imperative of restructuring should be highest in exposed, high value-added 
manufacturing parts of the economy. This is indeed the case. Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) 
show for 13 countries that the incidence of early retirement tends to be higher in 
manufacturing relative to the average across all industries – sometimes as much as twice as 
high. It is also high in mining and quarrying, construction and transportation, probably due to 
the physically demanding nature of these occupations, and lower than average in industries 
such as agriculture and fisheries, hotels and restaurants, wholesale and retail trade as well as 
real estate.4  
This typical sectoral pattern should have consequences for the politics of early exit. Sectoral 
differences are the reason why publicly funded early exit schemes can be seen as a cross-
subsidization of manufacturing by sheltered industries since early exit policies are usually not 
funded from sectoral schemes but from national programs such as the general unemployment 
insurance and the national pension scheme. From this perspective, early exit is best 
understood according to a logic involving cross-class coalitions between employers and trade 
unions in some industries. These alliances lobby the government for access to subsidized exit 
                                                           
4
 Interestingly, there was no clear cross-country tendency of early retirement in public administration. 
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pathways – and try to hold these pathways open as long as possible – in order to externalize 
some of the cost of restructuring. Due to increased cost-competition in global markets, 
manufacturers have a hard time internalizing restructuring costs. This quote by Ebbinghaus 
captures the dilemma of manufacturing employers very well:  
 
‘An internalization of these costs would require employers to seek working 
conditions adapted to older workers, and to be willing to hire, retain, and continue 
training older workers. Instead of internalizing these adaptation costs, firms often 
either use a market-oriented strategy of dismissing older workers without 
providing sufficient preretirement and severance pay, or use an externalization 
strategy by relying on public welfare systems […]. The available choices depend 
in large measure on state policies and the state of labor relations: To what degree 
do these actors go along with the externalization strategy or seek to foster or even 
mandate an internalization course?’ (Ebbinghaus, 2006: 49). 
Sheltered and/or low-productivity sectors should, however, try to work against early exit as 
they are either not subject to globalization pressures to the same extent or suffer more from 
higher taxes that accompany early retirement.5 The expansion of early exit and the speed of 
reversal of such policies thus depend on whether sectors in need of restructuring can shift the 
transition costs to the general public, thereby creating a redistribution of the costs of 
adjustment towards sectors with lower adjustment pressure. In the manufacturing sectors, say, 
the metalworking industry, both employers and trade unions should be in favour of public 
early exit pathways, as it can be seen as a way of increasing productivity without having to 
resort to excessive wage moderation or expensive layoffs (which may be virtually off limits 
                                                           
5
 This should be particularly the case for low-productivity service industries (e.g. personal services), as they are 
less able to compensate for increasing tax burdens through increased productivity. 
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anyway, in countries with high employment protection). It is a logic of intersectoral cost-
shifting. The empirical implications of this perspective are twofold. First of all, early exit 
should be higher when manufacturing is more important, as early exit is a specific response to 
the problem of restructuring of old industries.  
H1: The larger the relative size of manufacturing, the lower employment rates of older 
workers.6 
Moreover, we need to capture to what extent different sectors can externalize their 
restructuring costs. According to an Olsonian logic (Olson, 1982), externalization should be 
most difficult when organized interests are ‘encompassing’. Encompassing organizations – 
both employer and employee organizations – do not allow high value-added tradable 
industries to shift their cost to low-productivity industries in the sheltered parts of the 
economy in order to stay competitive in globalized markets. In more decentralized settings, 
however, such cost-shifting is possible. Here, cross-class coalitions can lobby the government 
for public early exit financed by taxes or social security contributions. The ‘encompassing’ 
character of an organization should be reflected in the degree of bargaining coordination, 
ranging from fragmented, firm or plant-based bargaining to high coordination either through 
centralized bargaining by peak organizations or through a high degree of de facto 
coordination across sectors (e.g. via highly synchronized bargaining). The degree of 
bargaining coordination conditions whether sectors subject to restructuring pressure, 
especially manufacturing, can influence the government. Therefore, this sectoral hypothesis 
can be formulated as follows:  
H2: The possibilities for tradable industries to bargain for early exit policies should be higher 
in countries where the level of bargaining coordination of industrial relations is low. 
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 Hypotheses are formulated with employment rates only. For the employment gap, the hypotheses can be 
applied similarly. 
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An alternative perspective would not stress the dynamics triggered by economic restructuring 
in different industries, but the overall balance of power between labour and capital. This is the 
traditional power resource logic of comparative welfare state research (Castles, 1978; Esping-
Andersen, 1985; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1983; Korpi and Palme, 2003). In contrast 
to the cross-class alliances expected by the sectoral perspective, the power resource approach 
stresses the antagonism between employers and trade unions (and their allies in the 
parliamentary arena). Public welfare state benefits are, according to this logic, typically de-
commodifying, that is, they decrease the dependence of wage-earners (and their dependent 
family members) from the labour market (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Early exit schemes, 
whether institutionalized as unemployment or pensions benefits, seem to fit this pattern. They 
allow older workers to have a decent standard of living without having to rely on wage labour 
at any cost. In other words, they are de-commodifying. ‘Active ageing’, by contrast, can be 
seen as a re-commodifying policy, forcing older workers to look for work or update their 
skills to be able to gain a livelihood in the labour market. From this perspective, the expansion 
of welfare state programs – de-commodifying benefits, in particular – is generally driven by 
the strength of the labour movement, represented by well-organized trade unions and social 
democratic governments working against organized employers and their allies, especially 
conservative or market-liberal parties. Conversely, we can expect employers and right-of-
center parties to try to cut back early exit benefits or close early exit pathways altogether. 
Power resources theory would thus expect that early exit increases – and hence employment 
rates of older workers fall – under social democratic governments. Social democrats should be 
more likely to try to de-commodify those parts of the labour force that are affected by 
restructuring (and social democrats should be slower to adopt active ageing policies, due to 
their re-commodifying nature). Hence: 
15 
 
H3: The higher the cabinet share of social democratic parties, the lower employment rates of 
older workers. 
At the same time, labour market policies such as early exit pathways often originate in the 
industrial relations arena. Jensen (2012) has shown that while for areas such as pensions and 
family policies, it is clearly the partisan composition that shapes social expenditure patterns, 
in areas closer to the labour market, the main channel of working-class interests lies outside 
parliament. From this perspective, trade union strength – measured in terms of trade union 
density – rather than the partisan composition of government should have a positive effect on 
early exit, that is, a negative effect on the employment rate of older workers. This leads to the 
following hypothesis on power resources in the industrial relations arena: 
H4: The higher the trade union density the lower employment rates of older workers. 
 
Method and Data 
To test which of the two perspectives is the more appropriate one we apply panel regressions. 
In our panel regressions two different measures for our dependent variables are used: first, the 
employment rates of older (male) workers7 and second, the employment gap, that is, the 
deviation of employment of older male workers to the overall male employment ratio. Using 
outcome measure instead of policy measures enables capturing the various incentives towards 
early exit embedded in different welfare states. For example, in many countries, the main exit 
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 The subject of this study is male employment above the age of 55. Female employment is driven less by early 
retirement but by a much more long-term secular trend: increased labour market participation, due to cultural 
change and educational advances. In order to sharply focus on just one of the two stories – i.e. the politics of 
early exit – we exclude female employment. 
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routes were not through the pension system but through the unemployment or disability 
insurance.8  
Our first measure of the dependent variable is the number of employed males between 55 and 
64 years in relation to the total number of males between 55 and 64 of age. Higher rates of 
early exit from the labour market should hence be visible in lower employment rates. 
Although labour force participation instead of employment rates is sometimes the preferred 
indicator, data availability is better for employment rates. In any case, unemployment rates of 
older workers tend to be very low (Hofäcker and Pollnerová, 2006: 33-35), which means that 
the correlation of employment rates and participation rates is extremely high for this group 
(r=.99). We look at absolute exit rates at point t, not cohort-adjusted relative exit rates. Our 
second measure is the difference between the overall employment ratio of males to the 
employment ratio of older workers. This indicator allows us to capture the extent to which the 
employment ratio of older workers deviate from the overall trend and therefore indirectly 
control for differences in cross-national general employment patterns. The sample includes 21 
OECD countries and covers the period from 1975 until 2010. The countries are: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
In the panel regressions, we do not include country fixed effects since many of the variables 
of interest are largely time-invariant and fixed effects would eliminate the very cross-country 
                                                           
8
 A correlation between this indicator and comparative information about early exit reforms strongly supports 
that employment rates of older workers is a good proxy for early exit policies. The comparative information on 
early exit reforms comes from the fRDB-IZA Social Reforms Database on changes in employment policy in 14 
EU countries over the period 1980-2007 (Anelli et al., 2014). Reforms that open early exit pathways clearly lead 
to a decrease of employment rates while the restriction of early exit options is followed by an increase in the 
participation of older workers in the labour market. This shows that our dependent variable is a valid proxy of 
early exit policies. The correlation is negative and statistically significant at least at the 1 per cent level. 
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differences we are interested in (Plümper and Tröger, 2007).9 To deal with panel 
heteroscedasticity, we estimate our models with panel corrected standard errors. Furthermore, 
in all models, first-order autocorrelation is present. We therefore estimate the models with 
first-order autoregressive disturbances. All models include time trend variables that capture 
the overall temporal dynamics. As we cannot exclude problems of endogeneity, we applied a 
Durbin Wu Hausman Test to check for endogeneity and, in the case of endogeneity, used the 
first and second lags of the endogenous independent variables as instruments. 
In order to test hypothesis H1 concerning the sectoral logic, we control for the size of the 
manufacturing industry, indicated by the share of employees in the manufacturing sector in 
relation to overall employment. We include an interaction variable between the wage 
bargaining coordination and the size of manufacturing to test our hypothesis H2. The level of 
wage bargaining coordination is measured with an index ranging from 1 to 5 (taken from 
Visser, 2010). A high value stands for an economy-wide bargaining i.e. the existence of 
enforceable agreements between the central organizations of trade unions and employers 
affecting the entire economy. A low value means highly fragmented bargaining mostly at the 
company level.  
The strength of left parties is captured by the share of cabinet seats held by leftist parties 
(H3). Some authors contend that rather than social democrats, we should expect the main 
advocates of early exit to be Christian democrats and other centrist parties. After all, these 
parties have used the strategy of limiting labour supply in other contexts, too, especially with 
respect to female employment (Hartlapp and Kemmerling, 2008; von Rhein-Kress, 1993). We 
therefore also control for the cabinet share of centrist parties. Trade union density (H4) is 
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 In some cases fixed effects models are even more biased than simple pooled OLS (see Plümper and Troeger, 
2013 for a detailed discussion). 
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measured by net union membership in relation to the total number of employees.10 See table 
A1 in the appendix for details on data sources.  
We include a comprehensive set of control variables. The pressure to increase productivity 
and efficiency by reducing the employment ratio of older workers should be stronger in 
economies that are highly integrated into the global market. As an indicator of economic 
globalization, we use the trade openness of the economy. The indicator measures the sum of 
imports and exports in relation to the GDP. In order to control for the demographic structure, 
we include the share of elderly population (65+) in relation to the total population. We expect 
adjustment pressure to be higher when the share of elderly people is high (i.e. a negative 
relationship with employment rates). However, a high share of elderly people logically 
implies a lower share of younger people, which could lead to lower pressure to replace older 
workers with younger ones (i.e. the relationship may also be positive). A government’s room 
to develop early exit policies should also be conditioned by institutional veto points. We use 
the index compiled by Henisz (2010) to control for institutional constraints and assume that 
early exit policies are easier to implement where there are fewer veto points. In other words, 
we expect a positive effect of veto points on employment rates. The growth of the real GDP 
captures the cyclical economic dynamics. In times of high economic growth, restructuring 
pressure should be lower (positive effect on employment). On the other hand, high growth 
leads to higher public revenue which could open up opportunities for generous support of 
early retirement (negative effect). In a similar vein, when the public debt is high, early exit 
should be lower (and hence employment rates of older workers higher). Furthermore, when 
the unemployment rate is high, the prospect of re-employment is particularly unfavourable for 
older employees. Therefore, we assume a negative effect on employment levels of older 
                                                           
10
 For reasons of restricted data availability, we have to concentrate on organization representing employees. 
However, qualitative studies have emphasized the importance of employers for the politics of early exit. Further 
research should focus on the systematic collection of information on the structure and strength of employers for a 
broad set of countries. Such data is necessary to appropriately address the inter- and intrasectoral bargaining 
processes leading to early exit.  
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workers. The overall health status of old people in a society should be relevant, too. The more 
healthy older people are, the lower should be the productivity losses and the higher the 
preferences to stay in work. The life expectancy of males at 60 – which is correlated with 
more nuanced indicators of individual health status (Milligan and Wise, 2012) – is used as a 
proxy for the health status of old male people (OECD, 2012). The measurement of all 
variables is described in further detail in table A1 in the appendix.  
 
Results 
Table 1 presents the empirical results of our panel regressions using the employment ratio of 
older workers as dependent variable. In table 2 the results for our models are displayed that 
include the employment gap. Apart from the dependent variable, the models are identical in 
both tables. The first models in each case only include our control variables to test in how far 
early exit is driven by the general socioeconomic and political environment. In model II, the 
variables capturing the balance of power are included. Model III checks our central cost-
shifting argument, by adding the size of the manufacturing sector, the degree of wage 
bargaining coordination and the respective interaction variable between wage bargaining 
structure and the size of the manufacturing sector. In the last models IV, we test all variables 
simultaneously.  
 
20 
 
Table 1: Empirical Findings: Employment Ratio of Older Workers 
 
Dependent variable: Employment Ratio of Older Workers  
Independent variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Globalization -0.0395 -0.0439* -0.0526** -0.0613** 
 
(0.0269) (0.0256) (0.0261) (0.0239) 
Centrist Government 0.00305 -0.00121 0.00822** 0.00516 
 
(0.00387) (0.00434) (0.00418) (0.00468) 
Elderly population (65+) 89.84*** 93.63*** 130.0*** 117.3*** 
 
(23.46) (25.14) (26.96) (26.67) 
Institutions 0.602 0.245 0.927 0.576 
 
(2.239) (2.379) (2.314) (2.580) 
GDP growth -0.0985*** -0.113*** -0.121*** -0.126*** 
 
(0.0357) (0.0400) (0.0409) (0.0432) 
Debt -0.0956*** -0.0992*** -0.107*** -0.104*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0115) 
Unemployment rate -0.663*** -0.702*** -0.648*** -0.726*** 
 (0.0854) (0.0875) (0.0895) (0.0897) 
Life Expectancy 0.972** 1.307*** 1.119*** 1.467*** 
 (0.378) (0.428) (0.405) (0.449) 
Union density  0.0271  0.0239 
  (0.0266)  (0.0296) 
Left Government 
 
-0.00559  -0.00363 
  (0.00460)  (0.00494) 
Size of Manufacturing 
 
 -0.265*** -0.331*** 
 
 
 (0.0869) (0.0813) 
Size of Manufacturing*Wage Coordination 
  
0.119*** 0.118*** 
 
  
(0.0363) (0.0373) 
Wage Coordination 
  
0.402** 0.410** 
 
  
(0.0870) (0.0809) 
Nob 525 501 446 446 
R-squared 0.845 0.843 0.829 0.832 
Wald Chi 405.36*** 382.71*** 469.58*** 451.58*** 
Notes: *** z<0.001, ** z<0.01, * z, p<0.05; standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 2: Empirical Findings: Employment Gap 
 
Dependent variable: Employment Gap 
Independent variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Globalization -0.0280 -0.0356* -0.0467*** -0.0581*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0182) (0.0162) (0.0157) 
Centrist Government 0.000723 -0.00471 0.00570 0.00123 
 
(0.00360) (0.00418) (0.00371) (0.00467) 
Elderly population (65+) 86.84*** 81.28*** 118.3*** 98.08*** 
 
(21.23) (23.42) (22.08) (24.07) 
Institutions -2.013 -2.123 -2.010 -2.345 
 
(2.245) (2.219) (2.345) (2.474) 
GDP growth -0.0854** -0.0969** -0.102*** -0.106** 
 
(0.0365) (0.0397) (0.0397) (0.0432) 
Debt -0.0578*** -0.0616*** -0.0638*** -0.0632*** 
 (0.00910) (0.00950) (0.00932) (0.00889) 
Unemployment rate 0.199*** 0.187*** 0.184*** 0.148** 
 
(0.0711) (0.0704) (0.0659) (0.0643) 
Life Expectancy 1.201*** 1.417*** 1.234*** 1.553*** 
 
(0.326) (0.353) (0.352) (0.390) 
Union density 
 
0.0492***  0.0558*** 
 
 
(0.0168)  (0.0180) 
Left Government 
 
-0.00838**  -0.00649 
  (0.00419)  (0.00475) 
Size of Manufacturing 
  
-0.385*** -0.390*** 
 
  
(0.0606) (0.0628) 
Size of Manufacturing*Wage Coordination 
  
0.108*** 0.105*** 
 
  
(0.0336) (0.0351) 
Wage Coordination 
  
0.452*** 0.462*** 
 
  
(0.165) (0.179) 
Nob 525 501 446 446 
R-squared 0.266 0.271 0.403 0.405 
Wald Chi2 148.30*** 142.67*** 270.80*** 297.86*** 
Notes. Employment Gap = Employment Ratio of Older Male Workers – Overall Employment Ratio of 
Older Workers; *** z<0.001, ** z<0.01, * z, p<0.05; standard errors in parentheses 
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The first model that only includes the control variables shows that globalization reinforces 
early exit. The pressure to restructure employment and to replace older workers is stronger in 
countries highly integrated into the international market. In contrast, the cabinet share of 
centrist parties does not make a difference for early exit. Furthermore, a demographic 
structure characterized by a high proportion of elderly people is associated with a high 
employment rate of older workers (and a low deviation from overall employment rate of male 
workers). Contrary to expectations, the overall institutional environment (veto points) does 
not influence early exit. The effects of GDP growth and public debt levels are highly 
statistically significant. High growth and a high level of public debt are associated with low 
employment of older people. With regard to the overall labour market situation, the 
employment ratio of older workers is closely related to the national unemployment rate. For 
the employment rate, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent 
level, while it is positive for the employment gap. The reason for this is simply that high 
unemployment decreases the overall employment rate, which ceteris paribus should also 
decrease the gap between the employment of older persons and the rest.11 Moreover, as 
expected, a high life expectancy – which we use as a proxy for healthy older workers – is 
associated with a great number of people above 55 still being employed.  
In model II, we tested the traditional power resource logic of comparative welfare state 
research. In all models, the coefficient of left government has the expected negative sign, but 
is only statistically significant in one model (table 2, model III). It is plausible that this result 
is driven by two conflicting objectives of left-wing parties. While social democratic parties 
have traditionally advanced de-commodification, they also typically strive at maximizing 
labour force participation, including the participation of older workers – not least in order to 
be able to pay for generous social programmes. If anything, the latter goal has become 
stronger during the period under review, with the rise of Third Way social democracy. This is 
                                                           
11
 Note that the employment gap = employment ratio of older workers – overall employment ratio.  
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also in line with Esping-Andersen’s verdict that Conservative welfare states, but not Social 
Democratic ones, were caught in a ‘welfare without work’ trap in the 1990s (Esping-
Andersen, 1996). The results for trade union density are also mixed. Interestingly, and 
contrary to theoretical expectations, the coefficient is positive in all models. When using the 
employment ratio of older workers as dependent variable, however, the coefficients are far 
from being statistically significant. It only turns out to be statistically significant in the 
employment gap models in table 2. This means that in countries with strong trade unions, 
early exit is lower and the difference between the employment of older workers and the 
general (male) population is small, which is not in line with theoretical expectations. Overall, 
the class politics perspective on early exit is not supported by our results. While the indicators 
of the power resources of labour explain some of the variation in some models, they are 
inconsistent as they go in different directions.  
When turning to the variables which test the main alternative, the sectoral politics perspective, 
the picture looks different. The coefficient of the variable capturing the size of manufacturing 
and therefore the pressure of adjustment as well as the wage coordination indicator are all at 
least statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent level. The importance of manufacturing clearly 
shows a negative effect on the employment ratio of older workers as well as on the (reversed) 
employment gap, which confirms our hypothesis (H1) that early exit is a response to 
industrial restructuring pressure. In line with hypothesis 2, the interaction variable between 
the wage bargaining coordination variable and the size of manufacturing (H2) is positive and 
statistically significant (at least at the 0.1 per cent level). When there is an economy wide 
bargaining structure including enforceable agreements between the central organization of 
unions and employers affecting the entire economy, unions and employers in tradable sectors 
tend not to successfully lobby for early exit strategies since the costs for early exit cannot 
easily be shifted to the overall economy. The negative effect of the size of manufacturing is 
24 
 
therefore attenuated. In contrast, in economies where the bargaining process is fragmented, 
trade unions and employers in the manufacturing sector have both the incentive and the 
opportunity to successfully lobby for early exit strategies, even against the interests of the 
non-tradable sectors. They do not have to bear the full cost for getting rid of less productive 
workers. Model IV tests all variables together and demonstrates that the results remain stable 
when testing the power resource argumentation and the cost-shifting argument 
simultaneously.  
Overall, whether countries go for early exit strategies or not is less a question of the balance 
of power between labour and capital but rather a question of the structure of the industrial 
relations, that is, the setting in which the relevant actors operate. Early exit is a dominant 
strategy when sectors highly under pressure for adjustment are widely represented in the 
economy and when those sectors are able to shift the costs for adjustment to the overall 
economy. Left-wing parties only matter to a limited extent due to the conflicting goals they 
pursue with regard to early exit. Nor is there an alternative partisan logic at work, as the 
coefficient of centrist governments is also instable. And finally, trade union density has the 
exact opposite effect than left partisanship, and only with regard to one of our measures of 
early exit. 
Conclusion 
The large differences in early exit policies and outcomes have caught the attention of scholars 
and policy-makers alike. There is a sizeable body of literature looking at individual retirement 
decisions or macro-economic determinants. Political factors, however, have not been studied 
in a large-N comparative analysis. While we build upon findings from the qualitative 
literature on early exit (especially Ebbinghaus, 2006), our study is the first large-N analysis 
that deals specifically with the politics of early exit. Our findings strongly support the 
previous qualitative results. We have addressed the question whether political and labour 
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market actors as well as the institutional environment influence early exit at the aggregate 
level for a sample of 21 OECD countries over the period from 1975 to 2010. We show that 
the political economy of low employment rates of older workers follows a sectoral logic, 
fuelled by economic globalization and industrial restructuring. Economies with large 
manufacturing sectors have come under enormous restructuring pressure in the last 40 years, 
involving a shift towards a ‘post-industrial society’ in which the service sector share in 
employment and in production has grown across the OECD. While manufacturing often 
retains an important status in many national economies in the developed world, it has been 
forced to transform itself from Fordist mass-production into a more specialized type of 
production based on highly productive and knowledge-intensive labour. This process was 
accelerated by the Oil Shocks of the 1970s. Early exit has been used by manufacturing 
employers to reduce their workforce and thereby increase productivity. 
But this is only part of the story. How this pressure is resolved, also depends on the structure 
of economic interest representation. When cross-sectoral coordination is low, employers and 
trade unions in manufacturing firms can organize to push the government to subsidize their 
restructuring costs via early exit policies and thereby shift costs towards sheltered parts of the 
economy. Such externalization of costs is not possible when sectors are highly coordinated 
and the organization of economic interests is encompassing. Our findings can thus be read 
against the background of a strand in the literature on the political economy of wage setting 
which expects that centralized and encompassing unions cannot externalize the costs of 
excessive wage inflation on society as a whole.  
One important alternative explanation was also tested, i.e. class-based policy-making. Yet this 
perspective did not have a robust and unambiguous impact on early exit outcomes. This 
broadly goes against the main thrust of mainstream comparative welfare state research. It is 
true that the class-based view became subject to heavy criticism in the 1990s and 2000s 
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(Mares, 2003; Swenson, 2002). While our results on early exit are certainly not in line with 
the power resources view, we are aware that early retirement is not a typical social policy, 
either. It represents a – perhaps rare – policy option on which (some) employers and (some) 
employees can agree under certain economic conditions. Similar temporal cross-class 
alliances can be found during imminent economic shocks, for example, when employers and 
trade unions lobby in favour of short-time work policies which tend to be equally biased 
towards manufacturing (Sacchi et al., 2011). Our results can also be read against the 
background of insider-outsider theories of the welfare state (Rueda, 2006). Highly organized 
manufacturing workers are the prototypical insiders of the post-war industrial model. We 
have shown that in the aftermath of the Oil Shocks, it was possible for their representatives to 
shift the costs of industrial downsizing to the overall economy. Rather than pitting a uniform 
class-based logic against a sectoral one, comparative political economy and welfare state 
research should aim at identifying the economic and institutional context conditions under 
which one rather than the other tends to prevail. 
In terms of policy implications, the article also demonstrates why some governments find it 
much harder to reform early retirement and turn towards ‘active ageing’ strategies than others. 
Not only does the economic adjustment pressure differ strongly between countries, some 
governments are also facing strong sectoral interest groups, sometimes with cross-class 
alliances acting against the interests of other sectors. Other governments deal with more 
encompassing industrial relations actors which are forced to internalize their conflicts about 
industrial restructuring. Our results imply that different political logics call for different 
political strategies on the path towards ‘active ageing’. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Variables and data sources 
 
 
 
Variable Description Source 
Trade Openness Sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP  in 
constant prices (2005) 
OECD (2010b), Social 
Expenditure Database  
Left Government  Cabinet seats of social democratic and communist parties as a percentage of total cabinet posts 
Heston et al.(2012) 
(PWT 7.1) 
Union Density Net union membership in relation to the total number of 
employees 
Armingeon et al.(2011), 
Comparative Political 
Data Set 
Elderly 
population (65+) 
Elderly population age 65 and over as a percentage of the total 
population Henisz (2010) 
Institutions Polcon III: Index of political constraints that estimates the feasibility of policy change (for details see Henisz (2002)) OECD, Factbook (2009)  
GDP growth Growth of real GDP OECD (2010a), Economic  Outlook 
Debt Gross government debt (financial liabilities) as a percentage 
of GDP 
Armingeon et al. (2011), 
Comparative Political 
Data Set 
Unemployment 
rate Unemployed as a percentage of civilian labour force 
Armingeon et al. (2011), 
Comparative Political 
Data Set 
Size of 
Manufacturing 
Number of employees in the manufacturing sector in relation 
to the total employment 
OECD (2010a), 
Economic  Outlook  
Life Expectancy  
 
Life expectancy of 60 year old men in years OECD (2012) 
Wage 
coordination 
5 = economy-wide bargaining, based on a) enforceable 
agreements between the central organizations of unions and 
employers affecting the entire economy or entire private 
sector, or on b) government imposition of a wage schedule, 
freeze, or ceiling 
4 = mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining: a) central 
organizations negotiate non-enforceable central agreements 
(guidelines) and/or b) key unions ande mployers associations 
set pattern for the entire economy. 
3 = industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting, 
limited involvement of central organizations, and limited 
freedoms for company bargaining 
2 = mixed or alternating industry- and firm level bargaining, 
with weak enforceability of industry agreements 
1 = none of the above, fragmented bargaining, mostly at 
company level routine involvement of unions and employers 
in government decisions on social and economic policy 
Visser (2010) 
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